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NOTE
MEDICAL PRODUCTS AND SERVICES LIABILITY:
PUBLIC POLICY REQUIRES LEGISLATIVE INNOVATION
AND JUDICIAL RESTRAINT
INTRODUCTION
Reflecting our societal awareness of consumer rights, courts
and legislatures have expanded general tort liability theories to
cover an increasing number of patient injuries. Recognizing this
trend, the specific purposes of this note are threefold: First, to
identify as doctrinally analogous the expansion of both medical
products and medical services liability; second, to consider some
of the currently significant problems related to the expansion of
medical services liability; and, third, since public needs are im-
mediate, to outline current approaches to the problem and to
suggest that both courts and legislatures utilize the successful
product liability contractile doctrines and restrictive legislative
formulae. Such an approach will help to ensure a more rational,
harmonious, and realistic treatment of medical services liability.
General tort liability may be based upon an intentional act
or negligence, or it may be based upon "strict" liability, a liabil-
ity without fault.' Whether a personal injury suit is based upon
nonnegligent strict liability for medical products or upon
negligence for medical services, the injured person may be placed
at a disadvantage by a statute of limitations; he may not know
of the injury and, therefore, may not be able to act within the
pertinent statutory time limit.' In personal injury cases several
points of time may be relevant: The time of the causative act, the
time of the injury itself, the time when the injured party first
knows of his injury, and the time when the injured party first
knows what has caused his injury.' Since statutes of limitations
normally begin to run when a cause of action accrues, the time
may expire before the person knows that he has been injured. In
' W. PROSSER. THE LAW OF TORTS § 6 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
Id. § 30.
See Note, Torts-Statute of Limitations in Medical Malpractice Cases-Justice
Sought andAlmost Attained, 21 DF PAUl, L. REV. 234 (1971); 3 ST. MARY'S L.J. 111 (1971).
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order to mitigate this harsh result, judges4 and legislators' have
expanded doctrines such as fraudulent concealment and the dis-
covery rule.
I. DOCTRINAL EXPANSION OF MEDICAL PRODUCTS AND MEDICAL
SERVICES LIABILITY
A. Fraudulent Concealment and the Discovery Rule
Under the fraudulent concealment doctrine, when a poten-
tial defendant knowingly conceals his negligent act so that an
injured party is delayed from bringing an action, the statute of
limitations does not commence running until the plaintiff discov-
ers, or reasonably could have discovered, his cause of action.6 This
doctrine would be applicable where a plaintiff discovers an injury
but is reassured by the physician that nothing is wrong.'
Under the more general discovery rule, fraud and conceal-
ment are not necessary factors; the statute of limitations does not
begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered, or reasonably
should have discovered, his injury.8 Where both courts and legis-
latures have attempted to balance the equities of the parties, the
multifaceted problems with historically disfavored stale claims9
have been arguably outweighed by the inherent inequities of lim-
I Owens v. Brochner, 172 Colo. 525, 474 P.2d 603 (1970) (where misdiagnosis resulted
in unnecessary surgery but there was no concealment, the court adopted the discovery
rule); Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23, 248 N.E.2d
871 (1969) (court adopted the discovery rule for foreign objects); Acker v. Sorensen, 183
Neb. 866, 165 N.W.2d 74 (1969) (where a physician continuously made affirmative repre-
sentations as to the cure of a cancerous condition, the court applied the discovery rule).
CAL. CODE OF CIV. PRO. § 340.5 (West 1954) (establishes the fraudulent concealment
doctrine and the discovery rule for actions against health care providers); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-80-105 (1973). The Colorado legislature specifically clarified the statutory limi-
tation periods for medical malpractice claims by revising the statute to omit the word
"accrue" and substituting the more expansive "discovered or in the exercise of reasonable
diligence and concern should have discovered . . . his injuries and the negligence or
breach of contract .... ." Ch. 232, § 1, [19711 Colo. Sess. Laws 952. For examples of
the traditional use of the word "accrue" in statutes of limitations, see GA. CODE ANN. §
3-1004 (1975), KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-510 (1964), and ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 753
(1965).
' See Note, Torts-Medical Malpractice-Statute of Limitations is Tolled When the
Plaintiff Produces Prima Facie Evidence to Raise Fraudulent Concealment as a Material
Issue of Fact, 5 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 209, 214-15 n.46 (1973).
See Owens v. Brochner, 172 Colo. 525, 532, 474 P.2d 603, 607 (1970).
Id.
Comment, Choice of Law: Statutes of Limitation in the Multistate Products Liabil-
ity Case, 48 Tui.. L. REV. 1130 (1974).
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iting an injured person's right to sue upon first discovery of his
injury."'
B. Related Rules and Doctrines
The surgical exception doctrine is closely related to the more
general discovery rule, but it is limited to those cases where a
foreign object has been left in a patient's body during surgery." I
Also related to the discovery rule is the continuing treatment
doctrine. Under this doctrine the statute of limitations does not
begin to run from the time of the alleged malpractice act itself;
so long as the potential defendant continues treating the person,
the malpractice is also deemed to continue, and the statute be-
gins to run only when this continuing treatment has terminated.,2
The informed consent doctrine is based upon the physician's
duty to sufficiently inform a patient of the risks inherent in a
proposed treatment or procedure. 13 Among the factors to be con-
sidered in each case are the following: The likelihood and serious-
ness of possible bad results; the alternatives that are available;
the necessity or urgency of treatment; and the individual pa-
tient's mental capacity and emotional maturity. 4 A physician's
duty to inform involves a professional medical judgment in each
individual case; the proper standards for disclosure in each case
are based upon expert medical testimony as to what a reasonably
prudent physician would have told that patient.'"
Under the general tort evidentiary rule of res ipsa loquitur,
when expert medical testimony is unavailable the jury may be
permitted to infer the defendant's negligence if the injury would
not normally have occurred in the absence of someone's negli-
gence, the defendant had exclusively controlled the situation, and
there had been an absence of any contributory action on the part
of the plaintiff." This evidentiary rule has been applied in surgi-
I" Owens v. Brochner, 172 Colo. 525, 474 P.2d 603 (1970). See generally Comment,
Opening Pandora's Box? An Extension of the Discovery Rule to Negligent Diagnosis in
Idaho, 8 IDAHO L. REV. 370 (1972); authorities cited note 3 supra.
" PROSSER § 32; Note, Medical Malpractice-Statute of Limitations Tolled Until
Patient Can Reasonably Discover Foreign Object Negligently Left in His Body During
Surgery, 8 GA. ST. B.J. 244 (1971); 3 ST. MARY'S L.J. 111 (1971).
12 D. HARNEY, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 269 (1973); Kroll, The Etiology, Pulse, and
Prognosis of Medical Malpractice, 8 SUFFOLK L. REV. 598, 612 (1974).
PROSSER § 32, at 165.
' Id. at 165-66.
" Id. at 165.
" Id. §§ 39, 40.
1976
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
cal cases where the plaintiff was anesthetized, the surgeon had
exclusive control, and other testimony was not available."
C. Concomitant Expansion of Hospital Liability
Hospitals historically avoided any liability for negligence
based upon their status as a defendant under the doctrines of
governmental or charitable immunity; however, courts have be-
come more willing to disregard this traditionally immune status.'8
When a hospital has liability insurance and a judgment will not
affect the hospital's trust fund or property, the doctrine of chari-
table immunity will not bar an action.'9 As the number of action-
able suits against hospitals has increased, insurance costs and
hospital charges to patients have also increased. 0
A hospital's potential liability may also be expanded under
the doctrine of respondeat superior. Under this doctrine the hos-
pital, as an employer, may be held liable for a tort committed by
an employee.2' Nurses and ancillary personnel have usually been
considered hospital employees, but physicians have traditionally
not been so considered. Distinctions, however, have been made
between staff and salaried hospital physicians and between
administerial and medical functions of a salaried physician."
The case of Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial
Hospital3 has been widely recognized as a potentially significant
extension of a hospital's liability for physician negligence. In
Darling the plaintiff was treated for a broken leg in the hospital
emergency room. A general practitioner on emergency call casted
the leg, which subsequently became swollen, discolored, and very
painful. The plaintiff later lost the leg because the pressure of
swelling tissue inside the cast impaired his circulation. The court
held the hospital liable and found that liability could be sup-
ported under two theories. First, the hospital failed to fulfill its
Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
PROSSER §§ 131, 133; Comment, Hospital Liability for the Negligence of Physicians:
Some Needed Legal Sutures, 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 844 (1974).
g Michard v. Myron Stratton Home, 144 Colo. 251, 355 P.2d 1078 (1960); O'Connor
v. Boulder Colo. Sanitarium Ass'n, 105 Colo. 259, 96 P.2d 835 (1939).
" AMA, MALPRACTICE IN Focus 21, 32 (1975) [hereinafter cited as AMA REPoRT].
" PROSSER § 69.
" See Comment, The Hospital and the Staff Physician-An Expanding Duty of Care,
7 CREICHTON L. REV. 249 (1974); Comment, supra note 18.
' 33 Il. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253, cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1965).
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traditional duty to provide an adequate number of nurses to mon-
itor patients and report a patient's worsening condition to the
attending physician. Under the second theory, the hospital failed
to fulfill a duty to supervise physicians and require consultations.
Since this second theory is based upon an expansion of the hospi-
tal's own duty of care, and since the physician was not a salaried
employee of the hospital, 4 Darling may have extended a hospi-
tal's liability beyond the respondeat superior doctrine."5
D. Medical Product Liability Limited by Statute and Decision
There have been doctrinal expansions of liability for both
medical products and medical services; under the expanding
products liability doctrine, courts have emphasized "no-fault"
injury; under the expanding services liability doctrine, courts
have emphasized "discovery" of the injury. Both doctrines, how-
ever, have resulted in an increase in the total number of poten-
tially actionable injuries. For example, a potentially actionable
injury may occur under an expansive product liability doctrine
where defective whole blood is used for transfusions.
At the present time no positive method exists for detecting
hepatitis virus in whole blood; while the hepatitis virus is identifi-
able, the person responsible (the donor) cannot be identified, and
there is no way to be sure that blood for a transfusion is "clean.""6
Although courts in some jurisdictions have held proper a strict
liability tort action where a patient has received a blood transfu-
sion that contained the hepatitis virus,2 strict liability for "un-
clean" blood has been sharply limited in Colorado, first by the
courts29 and then by legislative action.
29
In Allen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.30 the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Texas held that the
2 See Comment, supra note 18, at 850 & n.56.
25 Walkup & Kelly, Hospital Liability: Changing Patterns of Responsibility, 1974 INS.
L. 333, 338-40 (1974); Comment, The Hospital and the Staff Physicians-An Expanding
Duty of Care, 7 CRFIGHTON L. REv. 249, 252-55 (1974).
,. Schmaltz v. St. Luke's Hosp., 33 Colo. App. 351, 354, 521 P.2d 787, 789 (1974),
rev'd in part, aff'd in part, 534 P.2d 781 (1975).
21 Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 47 Il1. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970),
modifying 113 Ill. App. 2d 74, 251 N.E.2d 733 (1969).
21 St. Luke's Hosp. v. Schmaltz, 534 P.2d 781 (Colo. 1975).
CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-104 (1973).
"' 387 F. Supp. 364 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
1976
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statute of limitations (and also lack of privity) prevented the
plaintiff from recovering for an injury caused by taking birth
control pills. Eight days after the plaintiff commenced taking the
pills, she became ill and was hospitalized. The court used the
date that the plaintiff was first hospitalized for the illness to
begin running the statute of limitations, rather than a date ap-
proximately four months later when she was told by her doctor
that the defendant's pills had probably caused her illness.
By holding that the cause of action accrued from the date of
the injury, the court chose not to apply the discovery rule expan-
sively. While this suit was against a manufacturer, the court
noted and followed the usual Texas court application of the dis-
covery rule in medical malpractice cases, limiting the rule to
cases of fraudulent concealment or where foreign objects are left
in the body during surgery.' In explaining its rationale for using
this date to commence the running of the statute, the court
stated:
Although plaintiff may not have had actual knowledge of the cause
of her illness at that time, her symptoms were sufficient to permit
her to discover the source if she had acted with reasonable dili-
gence."
Thus, the court in Allen shifted the emphasis to the patient's
duty to act with reasonable diligence to discover the source of an
injury. This recognizes the sophistication of today's average
health care consumer, 33 and, therefore, the type of patient behav-
ior to be deemed reasonable, as well as the possible need to rebal-
ance the plaintiff-defendant equities in strict medical product
liability.
II. MEDICAL SERVICES LIABILITY-THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
PROBLEMS
Problems relating to both medical malpractice and medical
malpractice insurance are not new, but recently they have inten-
sified in the following interrelated areas: The increasing fre-
quency of malpractice claims; the increasing costs and decreasing
availability of medical malpractice insurance to protect health
1' Id. at 366.
32 Id.
13 A. SOMERS, HEALTH CARE IN TRANSITION: DIRECTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 81 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as SOMERS].
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care providers against the increasing claims; the tensions that
exist between what a physician and a court may deem as proper
medical care; the limited health care personnel and resources
presently available; and a rapidly changing societal milieu.34
When these factors are viewed simultaneously, the result is popu-
larly called the "malpractice crisis."35 While the word "crisis"
may have assumed a quotidian quality in English, in Chinese the
word "crisis" is written in two characters; one means danger and
the other means opportunity.
3
Senator Daniel Inouye, noting both the increased numbers of
medical malpractice claims and the increased costs of medical
malpractice insurance, compared the figures from 1960 to 1975 as
follows:
[T]en years ago, about 6,000 malpractice claims were filed each
year. By 1970 this number had risen to approximately 10,000 to
12,000, and today, it has been estimated. . . from 15,000 to 20,000
such claims are opened annually ...
In the period 1960-1970, nonsurgeon physician premiums went
up 540.8 percent, surgeon premiums 950 percent. Each year since
1970 has seen an additional increase of about 80 percent . . ..
There is a very real possibility that medical malpractice insur-
ance coverage may no longer be offered at all by private insurance
companies, or, if it is offered, that rates will become exorbitant.3"
A. Sources of the Problem
There is no single causative factor or reason for the sudden
and disruptive malpractice crisis phenomenon. Some of the rea-
sons that have been suggested are: The increased number of peo-
ple receiving health care services in this country; the changing
medical services as new drugs and new procedures introduce new
1, Id. See COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION
AND WELFARE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 5-20 (1973) [hereinafter cited as HEW REPORT].
11 Id.; AMA REPORT 11.
31 SOMERS Vii, citing Romano, J.A.M.A., Oct. 26, 1974.
" STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., 1ST
SESS.. AN OVERVIEW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 100-01 (Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter
cited as COMM. PRINT].
3 Id. at 6; AMA REPORT 22-23. Senator Inouye has suggested that exorbitant rates
will either be passed on to the consumer or will be so prohibitive that physicians may be
forced to retire or withdraw from the health care system. COMM. PRINT 101.
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risks of injury; and the changing and redefined expectations of
health care consumers and providers."
Under new health care programs, over twenty million per-
sons, including the elderly and medically indigent, are receiving
noncharity medical care for the first time in their lives.40 The
American Medical Association now recognizes the need for more
physicians.' From 1960 to 1970 twenty new medical schools were
started and health paraprofessional programs commenced; never-
theless, the physician shortage may account for a part of the
problem.42 Some medical experts have attempted to increase phy-
sician productivity by encouraging greater systemization, per-
haps at the expense of quality. This may also have led to a deteri-
oration in the physician-patient relationship.
Drug testing and quality controls are more rigorous than they
have been in the past,44 but, with new drugs and procedures being
discovered, a correlative number of new injuries may occur. Med-
ical discoveries, treatments, and cures receive wide publicity, but
all diseases are not curable and all patients are not cured, even
when the recommended treatment protocols are followed. Sugges-
tions that the increasing number of medical malpractice claims
may be related to a sudden increased incidence of physician mal-
practice or to a contingent fee system used by lawyers lack
merit; 9 the Secretary of HEW's Commission on Medical Mal-
practice found that it is an "inescapable fact that modem high-
quality medicine carries risks that unavoidably result in some
injuries to patients, no matter how much care, skill and judgment
is applied.""
The popularly expected "right to health" has effectively
masked part of the problem. 7 It "is very misleading [since it]
suggests that society has a supply of 'health' stored away" 8 which
" COMM. PRINT 100.
4 SOMERS 3.
" Id. at 8.
, Id. at 3, 8, 9.
' Id. at 9.
4 Id. at 3.
" HEW REPORT 32-33.
' Id. at 24.
, SOMERS 21.
Fuchs, The Jungle or the Zoo: What Price Health?, MED. EcoN., Apr. 28, 1975, at
160, 185.
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can be given to individuals on demand. The number of patients
has increased, patient demands have increased, and pressures on
physicians have increased.4" Traditionally, physicians have ac-
cepted heavy, self-imposed burdens in order to be available to
their patients. However, physicians as well as consumers have
become more sophisticated, and today's physicians are reexamin-
ing their traditionally accepted duty to be available2 °
B. Medical Malpractice Insurance
This past year, as medical malpractice insurance problems
became more acute in terms of the cost and the availability of
coverage, physicians in New York, Miami, and San Francisco
temporarily withheld nonemergency services." Unwilling to qui-
etly pass added insurance costs on to their patients, they have
effectively focused attention on the medical malpractice insur-
ance issues.5"
Two major types of medical malpractice insurance are
available: An "occurrence" policy covering claims from acts that
occurred during the policy period, whenever filed; and a "claims
made" policy that will only cover claims reported during the year
that the policy is in force.0 While lawyers, architects, and other
professionals have traditionally had "claims made" policies,
since medical malpractice claims for personal injury may not be
as discoverable as nonpersonal injury claims against other profes-
sionals and may not, therefore, be discovered until long after the
" SOMERS 6, 7, 25. Figures indicate an increase in the number of physicians in relation
to population, but this is misleading because factors not considered include the increasing
proportion of specialists, the uneven geographic distribution of physicians, and the in-
creasing numbers of foreign physicians who are not in this country permanently, but only
to complete their training. Id. at 7. Paradoxically, as patients become healthier, longer
lived, and more affluent, they need and demand more health care, yet they also become
more critical of the care they receive. Id. at 18-25.
50 Schwartz, The Changing Compact Between American Doctors and Society,
MODERN MED., June 15, 1975, at 32.
11 Id. See also Rocky Mountain News, Jan. 17, 1976, at 41, col. 3. But see Hendricks,
They Won Malpractice Relief-Without a Walkout, MED. EcON., Oct. 13, 1975, at 31
(description of response to these problems by Louisiana physicians).
52 Schwartz, supra note 50. The malpractice crisis has prompted a "Proposed Federal
Solution"-the National Medical Malpractice Insurance and Arbitration Act of 1975 (S.
482) introduced by Senators Edward Kennedy and Daniel Inouye; authorities cited, supra
notes 37, 38.
1 Hendricks, What Your Next Malpractice Policy May Look Like, MED. EcON., Apr.
14, 1975, at 29.
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alleged negligence, physicians have traditionally carried an
"occurrence" policy. To cover all the potential claims under an
"occurrence" policy, insurance companies need a large reserve
fund, popularly referred to as the "long malpractice tail. '54 How-
ever, while insurance companies acknowledge that the "villain is
that long claims 'tail',"55 most of them have also predicted that
a "claims made" policy premium will be as high as an "occur-
rence" policy premium in five years." Since an "occurrence" pol-
icy provides more than one year's protection and a "claims made"
policy provides only one year's protection, it is difficult to under-
stand how their costs could be equal.57
In a report prepared for the Colorado Medical Society, the
Hartford Insurance Company explained its rate increase for Colo-
rado physicians in 1975 as follows: Physicians purchasing the
minimum coverage of $100,000 had a rate increase of 15 percent
based upon the experience in Colorado, but physicians purchas-
ing $1 million coverage had a rate increase of 40 percent based
upon the country-wide phenomenon.5 8 The Colorado Medical
Society expects another rate increase of 94 percent in 1976.1' If the
medical malpractice insurance problems are not solved, insur-
ance companies may choose to leave the medical malpractice
marketplace, physicians may prefer to start their own insurance
companies, or legislatures (federal or state) may choose to regu-
late the field. 0
While they generally oppose any changes in traditional legal
doctrines and procedures, the Association of Trial Lawyers of
America (ATLA) has stated that medical malpractice insurance
I4 d.
I' d. at 35.
" AMA REPORT 22-23; Hendricks, supra note 53, at 35.
5' Hendricks, supra note 53, at 35. One approach to this problem is offered by Judge
Jamison who reasonably proposes that insurance companies be limited to pools based
upon claims successfully prosecuted by a statutory formula. Interview with Judge Francis
Jamison, Professor, University of Denver College of Law, Denver, Colo.
11 Warren & Sommer, Inc., Colorado Medical Society Professional Liability Insurance
Program (undated 1975 report on file with the Colorado Medical Society). Both physicians
and legislators in Colorado may question rate increases not based upon or justified by the
Colorado experience.
"' The Denver Post, Mar. 5, 1976, at 21, cols. 3, 4, 5 (statement by Colorado Medical
Society).
" MED. WORLD NEWS, June 16, 1975, at 20, 21, 22; AMA REPORT 22-23.
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must be made available at a reasonable cost,"' and has suggested
eliminating rate classifications between different risk medical
specialities, requiring deductibility clauses, and eliminating the
insured's consent as a condition for settlement." Legislation of
this type, permitting an insurance company settlement without
the insured's consent, may involve questions of constitutional
dimension. The proposals may be a denial of the physician's
equal protection and due process rights, but they are consistent
with the ATLA's position that "[t]he interests of the patient-
consumer must be paramount over those of the health care provi-
der, the lawyer, or the insurance carrier." 3 The American Medi-
cal Association (AMA) agrees with the ATLA that medical mal-
practice insurance must be made available at a reasonable cost,
but the AMA suggests the creation of a workmen's-compensation-
type program as an alternative to litigation. 4
C. Defensive Medicine
As the physician's potential liability has expanded, new pub-
lic policy questions have surfaced that are not yet answered. For
example, a fear of medical malpractice actions can lead physi-
cians to practice defensive medicine-order lab tests and diag-
nostic procedures at additional cost and possible risk to the pa-
tient to avoid a hindsight accusation of missing an unlikely diag-
nosis for lack of thoroughness."
Although physicians are aware of defensive medicine's higher
costs and nonessential utilization of scarce medical resources,6
hard cases may make bad medicine, as well as bad law. In Helling
v. Carey,7 the Washington Supreme Court unanimously held as
a matter of law that the defendant ophthalmologists should have
given the plaintiff a pressure test for glaucoma in spite of
uncontradicted testimony by plaintiff's and defendants' wit-
nesses that established defendants' compliance with the stan-
at Markus, A Position of Responsibility, TRIAL, May/June 1975, at 49, 50 (position
paper prepared by ATLA).
62 Id. at 50-51.
" Id. at 57.
, AMA REPORT 27.
6' COMM. PRINT 105.
, Id. at 6.
83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974).
1976
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dards of the profession of ophthalmology which did not require
routine pressure testing for glaucoma in patients under 40 years
of age.
The plaintiff had first consulted the physician for nearsight-
edness and had been fitted with contact lenses in 1959.68 The first
time the plaintiff complained of a visual field problem was in
1968; at that time the defendant tested the plaintiff's eye pressure
and subsequently made the diagnosis of glaucoma. 9 The plaintiff
was 23 years old at the time of her first visit; the incidence of
glaucoma in people under age 40 is one in 25,000; in people over
age 40 the incidence is two or three percent. 0
Although the plaintiff's "theory of the case" had not in-
cluded the adequacy of the ophthalmologic standards of care,7
the trial judge had refused the plaintiff's proposed instructions
defining these standards, and it was this error that the plaintiff
appealed.7" The majority opinion stated that the pressure test was
relatively inexpensive and simple, and, therefore, the court de-
cided as follows:
The precaution of giving this test to detect the incidence of glau-
coma to patients under 40 years of age is so imperative that irrespec-
tive of its disregard by the standards of the ophthalmology profes-
sion, it is the duty of the courts to say what is required to protect
patients under 40 from the damaging results of glaucoma.
We therefore hold, as a matter of law, that the reasonable stan-
dard that should have been followed . . . was the timely giving of
this simple, harmless pressure test to this plaintiff and that, in
failing to do so ... the defendants are liable.73
After reviewing the current medical literature on the diagno-
sis and treatment of glaucoma, Dr. Ray Bradford, an ophthalmol-
ogist, made the following observations:
The measurement of intraocular pressure by . . . tonometer
. . or... applanometer ... is well known ... and is used...
in clinical practice.
Id. at 515, 519 P.2d at 981.
Id. at 516, 519 P.2d at 981.
Id. at 518, 519 P.2d at 983.
7' Id. at 521-22, 519 P.2d at 985 (concurring opinion).
72 Id. at 516-17, 519 P.2d at 982.
" Id. at 519, 519 P.2d at 983.
VOL. 53
MEDICAL PRODUCT & SERVICE LIABILITY
There are, however, instances when it is not easy to get accurate
results and times when the test itself can be traumatic and
injurious .... 
Dr. Bradford described instances when pressure tests are contra-
indicated, listed the preferred diagnostic procedures, and sug-
gested that new studies indicate treatment should be withheld
until glaucomatous damage is definitely established." In addition
to risks inherent in the pressure test procedure itself, Dr. Brad-
ford noted that the predictive value of the test to diagnose glau-
coma is now questionable and that it is being done on a smaller
scale today since it is less valued as a screening procedure." He
concluded that the test is not definitive and suggested that a
judgment in each case determine the use and choice of instru-
mentation." Since a general anesthetic may be required to test a
child under age 14, anesthetic risks must also be considered in
determining whether the procedure should be performed."
The court in Helling noted that the issue-the ophthalmol-
ogic standard of care-was not argued at the trial.79 Neverthe-
less, the court concluded on the basis of evidence that had been
presented that the standard had been premised solely on the
lower incidence of glaucoma in people under age 40.1" Had the
issue been argued at the trial level, the record might have shown
the other factors to be considered, and the court might have
reached a different decision.
The testimony given did indicate that the professional stan-
dards required the test to be given if the patient's complaints and
symptoms revealed that glaucoma should be suspected."' Since
1, Bradford, A Unique Decision, 2 J. LEGAL MED., Sept./Oct. 1974, at 52, 53 (empha-
sis added).
71 Id. at 54.
76 Id.
17 Id. at 55.
7" Interviews with pediatricians and ophthalmologists in the Denver area. The physi-
cians interviewed indicated that the physicians in Helling may have been negligent under
medically accepted standards of care which are not absolute. There may or may not have
been enough questions directed to the physician-witnesses on the issue of whether or not
any of the specific earlier complaints of the plaintiff would or might have warranted an
earlier testing for glaucoma under the medical standards, since her case may not have
been routine.
7, 83 Wash. 2d at 516-17, 519 P.2d at 981-82.




the record did not contain evidence as to whether or not glaucoma
should have been suspected in this case or if the test could have
been timely and safely given to this plaintiff, the case could have
been remanded.2
Medicine depends upon the individualization of standards;
a physician, like Justice Cardozo, "struggles in vain for any ver-
bal formula that will supply a ready touchstone." 3 It is too early
to measure the effects of the Helling decision, but, when a court
presumes to determine proper medical care, it has assumed a
heavy responsibility. 4
III. MEDICAL SERVICES LIABILITY-PosSIBLE SOLUTIONS
A. Alternatives to Litigation
In the past few years no-fault or strict liability plans" and
arbitration or screening panels 6 have been suggested as alterna-
tives to the present litigation system. 7 While a no-fault or strict
liability plan could provide compensation to more injured per-
sons, it would be impractical in medical malpractice cases; cost
figures cannot be estimated and there are problems in determin-
ing causation.8 Since the eventual costs could be prohibitive, the
I d. at 518, 519 P.2d at 983; see note 78 supra.
Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).
g4 See note 78 supra; Comment, Physicians and Surgeons-Standard of
Care-Medical Specialist May be Found Negligent as a Matter of Law Despite Compli-
ance with the Customary Practice of the Specialty, 28 VAND. L. REV. 441 (1975); Com-
ment, Torts-Medical Malpractice-Judicially Determined Standard of Care-Helling v.
Carey, 20 N.Y.L.F. 669 (1975); Note, Medical Malpractice-Compliance with Professional
Standards Does Not Necessarily Absolve Ophthalmologist from Liability for Negligence
in Failing to Diagnose and Treat Glaucoma, 6 TEX. TEct. L. REV. 279 (1974). But see Note,
Helling v. Carey: Medical Malpractice Standard of Care Determined by Court, 11
WILLAMETTE L.J. 152 (1974).
1 Havighurst & Tancredi, "Medical Adversity Insurance"-A No-Fault Approach to
Medical Malpractice and Quality Assurance, 1974 INS. L.J. 69; O'Connell, An Elective No-
Fault Liability Statute, 1975 INS, L.J. 261; see Comment, Medical Malpractice: A Move
Toward Strict Liability, 21 LOYOLA L. REV. 194 (1975).
1S Lillard, Arbitration of Medical Malpractice Claims, 26 ARB. J. 193 (1971); Morris,
Medical Report: Malpractice Crisis-A View of Malpractice in the 1970's, 38 INS. COUNSEL
J. 521 (1971); Note, The Medical Malpractice Mediation Panel in the First Judicial
Department of New York: An Alternative to Litigation, 2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 261 (1974).
11 See generally King, A Commentary on the Report of the Malpractice Commission,
29 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 294 (1974); Kroll, The Etiology, Pulse and Prognosis of Medical
Malpractice, 8 SUFFOLK L. REV. 598 (1974); Lanzone, A Defense Lawyer Views Product
Liability and Professional Liability No-Fault, 1975 INs. L.J. 82.
11 See COMM. PRINT 32. Robert Keeton suggested that the problems with the no-fault
medical injury concept will be in determining awards, not because of the negligence issue
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benefits provided by this type of plan may in fact be chimerical.
Both compulsory and elective arbitration or mediation pan-
els have merit as screening panels and should be further studied
and considered by medical, legal, and legislative groups." How-
ever, the lack of sufficiently protective evidentiary rules, which
may not be overcome on review, limits the value of screening
panels as a settlement procedure in lieu of a trial.
B. Legislation-The Indiana Model
Recognizing the impact of medical malpractice insurance
problems on both health care providers and health care consum-
ers, in 1975 federal and state legislatures studied, proposed,
and/or enacted remedial statutes.' For example, the Indiana leg-
islature enacted a comprehensive statute specifically addressing
the medical malpractice issues.9'
1. The Statute of Limitations
The Indiana statute of limitations now limits all claims in
tort and contract against health care providers" to 2 years from
the date of the alleged act, failure to act, or neglect.9 3 A minor
under age 6 is given until age 8 to file, but otherwise the section
is specifically stated to apply to all, regardless of minority or legal
disability.94 A parent or a court-appointed guardian is not re-
quired by the statute to act on behalf of an injured child or one
who is legally disabled.95 When compared to the current Colorado
statutes," conspicuously, though perhaps purposefully, lacking
are any provisions relating to discovery of the negligent act.
but because of difficulties in determining causation; also, there can be no idea of the costs
that might be involved.
' See authorities cited, note 86 supra.
" See COMM. PRINT; Rhein, Malpractice: Grim Outlook for '76, MED. WORLD NEWS,
Jan. 12, 1976, at 71.
" IND. CODE §§ 16-9.5-1-1 to -9-10 (Supp. 1975). The Indiana Act is called the "bright-
est" spot in legislation for medical malpractice. MED. WORLD NEWS, June 16, 1975, at 20.
u2 The Indiana Act defines a "health care provider" to include
a person, corporation, facility or institution licensed by this state . . . as a
physician, hospital, dentist. . . nurse, optometrist, podiatrist, chiropractor,
physical therapist or psychologist, or an officer, employee, or agent thereof
acting in the course and scope of his employment.
IND. CODE § 16-9.5-1-1(a) (Supp. 1975).
11 Id. § 16-9.5-3-1.
I d.
See id.
" COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-80-105, 13-81-101 to -103 (1973).
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The Colorado statute of limitations"7 limits commencement
of actions against health care providers to 2 years after a person
discovers, or with reasonable diligence and concern should have
discovered, his injury. Although one is required to exercise "rea-
sonable diligence and concern to discover" and must commence
an action within 6 years of the act or omission complained of, an
exception is made for unauthorized or foreign objects left in the
body. " This 6-year limit could reasonably be reduced to 4 years.9
However, under the Colorado disability statutes, unless the court
has appointed a guardian for a minor, the applicable statute of
limitations is tolled for a minor until the minority is termi-
nated. 0 By statutory fiat, Colorado defines a legal representative
as "a guardian, conservator, executor, or administrator duly ap-
pointed by a court . . . ." Since the word "guardian" does
not encompass parents, by adding the words "the parent of any
child born or adopted" before the words "a guardian," the stat-
ute would recognize parents as the legal representatives of their
children, and the personal injury statute of limitations would not
be tolled automatically for most minors.'"'
Although a minor is certainly capable of owning property or
a cause of action, he is incapable of effectively dealing with it.
When a minor is required to file an income tax return for earned
income, if he is unable to complete the return himself, his parent
or guardian has an affirmative duty to file it for him. 103 While a
personal injury suit may not be obligatory, a parent or guardian
could be encouraged to file on behalf of the child. In this way an
injured child might be better protected, and any expensive reha-
bilitation or continued care treatments would not need to be post-
poned. In addition, tolling the statute for minors only up to age
7 effectively docks the long malpractice tail by 11 years. The
statute of limitations should specifically state that it applies to
" Id. § 13-80-105.
I d.
" See COMM. PRINT 197; ch. 75-9, § 7, [19751 Fla. Sess. Laws 20, amending FLA. STAT.
§ 95.11 (Supp. 1975).
'M COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-81-101 to -103 (1973).
'01 Id. § 13-81-101(2).
'a' Under current Colorado law a personal injury action can be brought up to 27 years
after an injury to a newborn infant. See Johnson v. Dodrill, 265 F. Supp. 243 (D. Colo.
1967).
"' INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6012(b)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-1(a)(4) (1975).
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minors over age 7, and that a parent, or a court-appointed guard-
ian for a minor under age 7, has until the minor's ninth birthday
in which to file. While Indiana chose age 6, age 7 would seem
more reasonable, because by age 7 a physical or mental handicap
is usually recognized by the school, testing is more reliable, and
the child is better protected than he would be at age 6.104 Al-
though age 6 to 7 is only 1 year, developmentally it is quite signifi-
cant. '5
2. The Ad Damnum Clause
The ad damnum clause of a complaint names the specific
total dollar amount of damages claimed.'"' Since the amount
claimed in the ad damnum clause bears little relationship to the
amounts actually obtained or even expected, and since an in-
flated ad damnum clause attracts notoriety and sensational
newspaper coverage, it has been suggested that states should
enact laws to eliminate dollar amounts in the ad damnum clause
for medical malpractice claims, while allowing admission of evi-
dence of specific actual damages at the trial. 07 Indiana elimi-
nated the ad damnum clause for medical malpractice actions; 08
other states, including Colorado, might follow a similar format."9
3. A Limited Recovery
The Indiana Act limits a plaintiffs recovery for malpractice
to $100,000 from any one health care provider and the total
amount recoverable for any injury or death to $500,000.110 Any
amount due from a judgment or settlement in excess of the total
liability of all health care providers, up to the $500,000 allowed,
is to be paid from a state compensation fund."' Although the
constitutionality of statutes limiting awards has been questioned,
"'1 W. NELSON. TEXTBOOK OF PEDIATRICS (7th ed. 1959); D. WECHSLER, WECHSLER
INTEL.IGENCE SCALE FOR CHILDREN (Manual) at 13, 14, 20, 21 (1949); Grossman,
Symposium on Learning Disorders, 20 PEDIATRIC CLINICS OF N. AM., Aug. 1973.
"7 See authorities cited note 104 supra.
m BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 56 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
'7 HEW REPORT 38.
IND. CODE § 16-9.5-1-6 (Supp. 1975).
"' See HEW REPORT. See also ch. 75-9, § 8, [1975] Fla. Sess. Laws 21, creating
section 768.042 which prohibits the stating of the amount of general damages in any
complaint for recovery of damages for personal injury or wrongful death.
".. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-2-2 (Supp. 1975).
. The fund is created by levying a surcharge on all health care providers in Indiana,
the levy limited to 10% or less of the yearly cost of each provider's liability coverage. Id.
§ 16-9.5-4-1. The pool of funds is limited to approximately $15 million. Id. § 16-9.5-4-1(f).
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the arguments to support these doubts are not persuasive.2 For
example, in Colorado one's right to sue may be limited by stat-
utes proscribing theories under which one may sue," 3 the time in
which one may sue,"' or the amount for which one may sue." ' The
Colorado Supreme Court, in upholding the validity of a time-
limiting statute for medical malpractice in McCarty v.
Goldstein"' explained as follows:
The classification of ... professions for limitation or regulation is
a matter for legislative determination, and when based upon reason-
able grounds will not be interfered with by the judiciary."7
Legislation that is reasonably related to the public health
and safety may provide equal protection as well as procedural due
process and be upheld constitutionally under several theories: An
implied consent to limit damages; an implied contract to limit
damages; or the general police power of the state."' If a fair and
reasonable procedure is provided, due process is satisfied; there
is little reason to doubt the validity of reasonable statutory time
limits or damage award limits that apply to both adults and
minors, particularly if concomitant legislation requires health
care providers to carry liability insurance." 9
"' Curran, Law-Medicine Notes: The Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Short-term and
Long-term Solutions, 293 NEw ENG. J. MED., July 3, 1975, at 24, 25. (The arguments are
not persuasive because support is essentially nonexistent.)
"' CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-104 (1973) (prohibiting any no-fault recovery for
injuries due to transplants or transfusions).
"I Id. §§ 13-80-101 to -81-107 (various statutes of limitations).
'i Id. § 8-42-204 (limits damages for personal injury resulting solely from negligence
of a coemployee to $25,000).
uS 151 Colo. 154, 376 P.2d 691 (1962).
"7 Id. at 158, 376 P.2d at 693.
" School Dist. No. 1 v. Industrial Comm'n, 66 Colo. 580, 185 P. 348 (1919). The
Workmen's Compensation Act was passed under the police power of the state. Cf. Day-
Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952) (the Court notes the broad and
inclusive concept of public welfare and that debatable issues of public welfare should be
left to legislative decision).
"' See Finn v. Industrial Comm'n, 165 Colo. 106, 110, 437 P.2d 542, 544 (1968), where
the court affirms the legislature's power to provide a different remedy; the fact that a
workmen's compensation award may deprive an injured person of compensation or a
common law action does not make such a statute unconstitutional. See also O'Quinn v.
Walt Disney Prods., Inc., 177 Colo. 190, 193, 493 P.2d 344, 345 (1972), where the court
stated that "so long as a statute in abrogation of the common law does not attempt to
remove a right which has already accrued, there is no taking."
In the case of a child who had been injured at birth and who is now five years old,
the recommended law would not remove the right to sue; it would merely limit the time
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C. Legislation-Colorado
If the legislature determines that a limitation on awards is
prophylactically desirable in Colorado, the Indiana format ap-
pears reasonable. A less comprehensive, but sufficiently protec-
tive, legislative formula might combine a requirement that all
health care providers carry a specified level of malpractice insur-
ance with a limit on malpractice judgments to that statutory
amount. The statutory limit would not apply to health care provi-
ders who fail to carry the specified coverage. At this time it is not
possible to judge how these types of statutes will work; however,
if insurance companies continue to base rates on the national
experience, the effects of state legislation limiting the amount of
an award may be negated.'2
In 1975 the Colorado legislature passed three statutes affect-
ing review of a physician's conduct. These statutes will enable
physicians to institute disciplinary proceedings against a fellow
physician without fear of retaliatory litigation.'2 ' A physician re-
view committee may recommend disciplinary action to the Colo-
rado State Board of Medical Examiners;'22 when such a recom-
mendation is made, follow-up procedures are established to pro-
vide investigations, hearings, and determinations.'1 The Colo-
rado Court of Appeals has initial jurisdiction to review actions
taken by the board in revoking or suspending a license or in
placing a physician on probation. 4 These codified procedures
will ensure sufficient protection both for the physician accused
and the health care consumer, since physicians will be able to
discipline themselves more effectively.' 5 The present Colorado
statutes also allow incorporated physicians to limit their liability
for a corporate associate's negligent malpractice, if the required
within which that right could be exercised and, therefore, since it would not amount to a
taking, could be applied retroactively. See note 131 and accompanying text infra.
' " See note 59 and accompanying text supra.
" CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-43.5-101 to -103 (Supp. 1975), provides the members
of the review committee with immunity from any civil action if they act in good faith.
" Id. § 12-43.5-102(3)(d).
,9 Id. §§ 12-36-118(1), (2).
124 Id. § 12-36-119(2).
' Physician-representative Frank Traylor should be commended for his leadership
in sponsoring this type of legislation. Dr. Traylor is presently studying a pretrial screening




statutory formalities are followed and if the professional
corporation or the physician himself carries the required mini-
mum malpractice insurance. 2
The Colorado Legislative Committee on Medical Malprac-
tice has prepared several bills for consideration in 1976; however,
the committee has failed to recognize some of the crucial issues
involved'27 and, in attempting to protect consumers, concomitant
rights of health care providers have been ignored.2 8 One of the
proposed bills provides that the patient records in a physician's
office, including the physician's work product notes to himself,
shall be available to the patient, or a copy made upon payment
of a reasonable fee. (There is an exception made for psychiatric
or psychological problems; in these cases a summary rather than
a copy must be provided.)' 9
Proposed legislation for Colorado should include statutes
limiting the amount of pooled reserves that insurance companies
can maintain and/or a program similar to Indiana's so that health
care providers can self-insure. Additional insurance company reg-
ulatory statutes might also be considered, since, out of each dollar
presently collected for medical malpractice insurance, between 62
"' COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-3 6 -13 4(1)(g) (Supp. 1975), requires the articles of
incorporation of a professional service corporation for the practice of medicine to provide
that all shareholders (physicians) are jointly and severally liable for employee acts or that
they are exempt when they maintain professional liability insurance that meets listed
minimum standards. This type of legislated minimum liability insurance standard was
upheld in Walkovzsky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585, 223 N.E.2d 6 (1966).
"I Rep. Frank Traylor, M.D., committee member, stated that the committee was
hostile to physicians and concentrated on consumer (patient) problems. Rocky Mountain
News, Jan. 11, 1976, at 30, col. 1.
"" COLO. COMM. ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INTERIM REPORT (1975-1976). Contained in
the INTERIM REPORT is Proposed Bill H-1 which would amend the COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
as follows: Section 10-4-804 would require health care providers to purchase professional
liability insurance in the amount of one hundred thousand dollars per occurrence as a
basic coverage (this is not the same amount that is required by the professional corpora-
tion statute); section 10-4-803(1) would authorize the commissioner to levy an annual
surcharge on all health care providers for an extraordinary loss fund; section 10-4-803(2)
would state that failure to purchase the basic coverage or to comply with the other
provisions shall result in the suspension or revocation of a health care provider's license;
section 10-4-804(5) would authorize the commissioner to defend, litigate, settle, or com-
promise any claim in excess of the basic coverage (the insured's consent as a condition
for settlement is eliminated). Proposed Bill H-1 does not consider the ad damnum clause.
" Id. Proposed Bill E.
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and 84 cents goes to the insurance companies for costs and
profit. 130
In any legislation, since it is "well established that statutes
of limitation . . . will not be given retroactive application in the
absence of an express direction from the legislature to do so,''131
it is suggested that the legislature expressly provide for any de-
sired retroactive application.
D. Judicial Action
The Colorado Supreme Court has shown acumen in its re-
sponses to rapidly changing societal demands, 132 and restraint in
cases dealing with the liability of hospitals. While Moon v. Mercy
Hospital3 3 was decided prior to the Darling case, 34 the court,
under an independent contractor rationale, did not find the hos-
pital liable for the actions of a staff physician; the court recog-
nized that hospitals do not practice medicine and that strict lia-
bility would be inappropriate. Recognizing the inherently per-
sonal relationship between a physician and a patient, and refus-
ing to make artificial distinctions between a staff physician and
a hospital-employed physician, the Colorado Supreme Court did
not apply a Darling type doctrine but stated:
[T]he hospital cannot and does not practice medicine and, hence,
cannot be charged with the careless and negligent performance of
medical services by a doctor on the staff of the hospital or employed
by the hospital .... 35
St. Luke's Hospital v. Schmaltz136 is a recent illustration of
the court's restraint in dealing with hospital liability. The deci-
sion quoted the statutory language dealing with blood transfu-
sions (although the statute itself was not effective on the date of
the incident):
[Tihe imposition of legal liability without fault upon the persons
and organizations engaged in such scientific procedures may inhibit
'~' COMM. PRINT 15.
Valenzuela v. Mercy Hosp., 34 Colo. App. 5, 9, 521 P.2d 1287, 1289 (1974).
,.2 As the court of appeals notes in Valenzuela, in 1971 the Colorado legislature merely
codified existing case law by incorporating the discovery rule. 34 Colo. App. at 9, 521 P.2d
at 1289. See note 5 supra.
150 Colo. 430, 373 P.2d 944 (1962).
,3, See text accompanying note 23 supra.
Moon v. Mercy Hosp., 150 Colo. 430, 433, 373 P.2d 944, 946 (1962).
534 P.2d 781 (Colo. 1975).
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the exercise of sound medical judgment and restrict the availability
of important scientific knowledge, skills, and materials. It is, there-
fore, the public policy of this state to promote the health and welfare
of the people by emphasizing the importance of exercising due care,
and by limiting the legal liability . . . to negligence or willful mis-
conduct.'"
There had been no prior cases in Colorado extending hospital
liability in this area, and the court chose not to do so in this
decision. 11
In Owens v. Brochner,'11 a leading Colorado medical mal-
practice case, the Colorado Supreme Court used the term "rea-
sonable diligence" to describe a patient's duty to discover the
physician's negligence. 40 Brochner indicates that whether the
statute of limitations bars a particular claim is a fact question;
thus, whether a plaintiff can reasonably be expected to know the
cause of an injury is a question for the jury.' While this recog-
nizes the fluidity of the "patient's duty" standard, the court's
instructions to the jury could be determinative. When the
Brochner ruling was applied in Nitka v. Bell, 42 the plaintiff's
status as a layman was emphasized.4 3 There may be a question
of whether or not a layman (plaintiff) today can be justifiably
ignorant; his behavior may need to be measured by rapidly
changing standards.' Following Brochner, the Colorado legisla-
tors clarified the statute of limitations for actions against health
care providers by substituting the words "discovered or in the
exercise of reasonable diligence and concern should have discov-
ered . . . his injuries and the negligence or breach of contract"
for the word "accrued.' 45
In balancing the equities between physician and patient, the
Colorado Supreme Court recognized that the burden of stale
'3 Id. at 782.
Id. at 783.
131 172 Colo. 525, 474 P.2d 603 (1970).
"I Id. at 532, 474 P.2d at 607.
1 Id. at 529, 474 P.2d at 605.
"1 29 Colo. App. 504, 487 P.2d 379 (1971).
Id. at 509, 487 P.2d at 381-82.
' See SOMERS 81. Since the discovery of insulin and its use in the physician-directed
but patient-administered treatment for diabetes, there have been other equally complex
and serious therapies that require a knowledgeable and responsible patient.
"I See notes 5 & 132 supra.
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claims is outweighed by the needs of a plaintiff (patient) to have
his day in court.4 "' In balancing the equities today, however, sev-
eral new factors must also be considered. One factor is the sub-
stantive duty of a patient today. Professor Prosser, quoting Mr.
Justice Holmes, notes that "the law takes no account of the infi-
nite varieties of temperament, intellect and education ....
Perhaps a patient should, therefore, be held to that degree of care
generally to be expected from a reasonable and prudent person
in the same or similar circumstances. 4 While the Colorado Su-
preme Court has noted that the degree of care to be expected is
a jury question,'49 in any review of a lower court's ruling on a
motion for a judgment non obstante verdicto or on the appropri-
ateness of any jury instructions given or not given, the reviewing
court must consider the level of sophistication of today's patient,
because "the public is much better informed than it used to be,
and it no longer regards a doctor's views as law."' 50 Other
medical-legal concepts such as informed consent also recognize
the increased sophistication of today's health care consumer.,'
A second factor to consider in balancing the equities between
physician and patient is the duty of today's health care provider.
The law does not require the impossible, yet today's rapidly
changing situation may be latently presenting physicians with
impossible choices. For example, in Michigan physicians found
that the malpractice crisis and insurance costs were "affecting
the availability and quality of the state's medical care to a critical
degree."'52 In Colorado and other states with growing populations,
there are not enough primary care physicians to meet the con-
sumer demand.'5 3 A fatigued physician's failure to treat might be
"' Owens v. Brochner, 172 Colo. 525, 474 P.2d 603 (1970).
"' PROSSER § 32, at 152.
", Id. at 151.
", Owens v. Brochner, 172 Colo. 525, 474 P.2d 603 (1970). But see Valenzuela v.
Mercy Hosp., 34 Colo. App. 5, 521 P.2d 1287 (1974), where the court found that, even as
a layman, the plaintiff should have known that she had a cause of action.
11 TIME, June 16, 1975, at 49; COLO. SuP. CT. COMM. ON CIV. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, COLO.
,JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 15:8 (1969) (duty of patient to follow instructions). See notes 33 &
144 and accompanying text supra.
"' SOMERS 81. The consumer must learn to prevent illness and also frequently to assist
in his own care and treatment.
"2 Hendricks, The $42,000 Premium that Closed a Practice, MED. ECON., Apr. 28,
1975, at 142.
11 See SOMERS 7.
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deemed negligent, yet he might also be deemed negligent in at-
tempting to treat. The lines of moral and legal culpability are
fuzzy.
Third, and perhaps most important for a court to consider in
balancing the equities, are the alternatives and public policy
implications.
While public policy requires that the general populace be protected
in its dealings, it is submitted that public policy also commands
that the medical practitioner be equally insulated in his pursuit of
his profession.'5
CONCLUSION
In order to meet the needs of health care providers and health
care consumers, it is essential that the legislature work with the
judiciary to provide a solution to the problem. Suggested statu-
tory additions for Colorado may be summarized as follows: (1)
Reduce the 6-year absolute limit in COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
80-105 (1973); (2) add to COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-81-101 (1973)
the words "the parent of any child born or adopted" and, thereby,
for purposes of COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-81-101 to -103 (1973),
recognize a parent as the legal representative of a child; (3) spe-
cifically state that COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-80-105 (1973) ap-
plies to a minor over age 7, that a parent or court-appointed
guardian for a minor under age 7 has until the minor's ninth
birthday to file, and that a parent or court-appointed guardian
of a minor over age 5 at the date of the act has at least 4 years
from the effective date of the act within which to file; (4) elimi-
nate the ad damnum clause for medical malpractice actions; (5)
require health care providers to purchase minimum malpractice
insurance coverage (allow physicians to set up their own com-
panies to do this if needed), limit the maximum awards for
medical malpractice injury cases to this amount, and limit insu-
rance companies to rate-setting rationally related to those limits;
and (6) expressly provide for retroactive application of these
changes.
These suggested additions for Colorado are less dramatic
than Indiana's new statute, but they would be compatible with
" Comment, Contractual Liability in Medical Malpractice-Sullivan v. O'Conner,
24 DE PAUTI, L. REv. 212, 226 (1974).
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Colorado's existing legislative framework and philosophy of pro-
moting "the exercise of sound medical judgment [and] the
health and welfare of the people . ..."I5
Following its established practice of attempting to balance
the physician-patient equities, the Colorado Supreme Court fash-
ioned a flexible tool in Brochner. 5 While the factors to balance
have now changed-from the 1970 choice of stale claims or one
patient's right to sue, to the more complex needs of all health care
consumers for medical services-the court-fashioned tool of
"should have discovered" '57 can be swiftly utilized to ensure fair-
ness to both health care providers and health care consumers in
a rapidly changing society.
The Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare summarizes the situation as follows:
The gradual expansion of the discovery rule to an increasing
number of treatment-injury situations may have an adverse effect
on other aspects of the malpractice problem, particularly in the area
of establishing rates for malpractice insurance.
Unquestionably, the trend . . . has been towards the imposi-
tion of greater liability on health care providers . . . . [T]his trend
may be extended unreasonably and unfairly in the future . .. and
S.. this is bound to have a deleterious effect on the delivery of
health care."'
Although the courts have generally deferred to legislative pro-
nouncements of public policy,'59 when a balancing of equities has
required the courts to lead, they have done so.'6 0 Perhaps a court
knows that a refusal to make a decision is in itself a decision.
Judith Steinberg Bassow
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-104 (1973). For a unique approach to legislation in
the malpractice area, see Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1976 AM.
BAR FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 87, which suggests that there be a contractual limitation of
damages between physician and patient. One problem with this suggestion is that the
UNIFORM COMMERCIAl. CODE, a relevant codification of commercial law principles, declares
that a damages limitation for personal injury "is prima facie unconscionable .... "
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-719(3). Although Epstein's suggested legislation is imagi-
native and perhaps practical, it would be difficult to base it upon commercial practices
and even more difficult to persuade legislatures and courts that it is not unconscionable.
,5, 172 Colo. 525, 474 P.2d 603 (1970).
"' Id. at 532, 474 P.2d at 607.
14' HEW REPORT 30-31.
See Moon v. Mercy Hosp., 150 Colo. 430, 373 P.2d 944 (1962).
,, Owens v. Brochner, 172 Colo. 525, 474 P.2d 603 (1970).
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